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This study examines the association between ownership structure and
audit fess. Especially, this study focuses on the ownership structure
measured by the divergence of control and ownership. If an owner owns
a company through the pyramidal structure, it is possible that the
voting rights of the owner are greater than the cash flow rights of the
same owner. The difference could influence the firm’s audit-related
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policy and auditor’s behavior. This study examines this issue by
focusing on audit fees.
Using 436 firm-year observations collected over 2003-2005 period
from Korean stock market and the divergence data provided by Korea
Fair Trade Commission, we examine above prediction. The empirical
results reveal that the audit fee is negatively correlated with the
divergence. It suggests that the audit quality is lower when there exist
greater divergence. It is because the divergence is related to the
incentive for owners to expropriate minority shareholders. In order to
hide the expropriation from outside minority shareholders, it is possible
that the owner asks the auditor to provide low quality audit service
which in turn results in low audit fees.
Keywords: audit fees, cash flow right, voting right, ownership
structure
INTRODUCTION
This study examines the association between ownership
structure and audit fess. Especially, this study focuses on the
ownership structure measured by the divergence of control
(voting right, i.e., the ability to elect the board of directors and
influence or dictate decisions that require shareholder approval)
and ownership (cash flow rights i.e., claims on cash payouts or
dividend). The divergence implies the difference between
controlling owners’ cash flow rights and voting rights. If an owner
owns a company through the pyramidal structure, it is possible
that the voting rights of the owner are greater than the cash flow
rights of the same owner. The difference could influence the
firm’s audit-related policy and auditor’s behavior. This study
examines this issue.
Ownership of the public corporations across the world is not so
widely dispersed. Instead, higher ownership concentration
somehow prevails in the developed countries as well as in the
developing countries (Claessens et al. 2000; Faccio and Lang
2002). Ownership and control structures of many public
companies in East Asia and Western Europe are well
characterized by family-control, close relation of managers with
the controlling owners, and the controlling owner’s voting rights
exceeding cash flow rights (Claessens et al. 2000; Faccio and
Lang 2002; Haw et al. 2004; LaPorta et al. 1999; Shleifer and
Vishny 1997). 
One of the most salient features of the ownership structure in
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East Asia is the complicated pyramidal and cross-holding
ownership structures1) typical among East Asian companies (Fan
and Wong 2002). Among these companies, controlling owners in
the region usually have higher level of control rights than the
level of their equity ownership. Therefore, there exists divergence
between cash flow rights and voting rights. In prior accounting
and finance literature, this divergence is widely used as a proxy
for the information asymmetry or the risk (or the possibility) of
expropriations against minority shareholders. This divergence
could influence the owner and managers’ behavior which in turn
influence the audit fee. 
On the one hand, the divergence could be positively associated
with audit fees. The auditor is paid a fee to attest to the
assertions contained in the client’s financial statements, and
presumably the fee reflects the work the auditor must perform to
bear the audit risk (Choi et al. 2007a; Craswell et al. 1995;
Simmunic 1980). Seetharaman et al. (2002) find that audit fees
reflect risk differences across countries with different level of
legal liability regime. Higher legal regime motivates the auditors
to increase effort in defense against the increased likelihood of
future litigation (Simunic and Stein 1996) and/or charge an
insurance premium to cover possible future litigation costs (Pratt
and Stice 1994). In either case, audit fees should increase if the
divergence is related to the risk of audit. We call this ‘audit risk
perspective.’
On the other hand, it is well known that audit quality is priced
in the audit market (Carcello et al. 2002; Choi et al. 2007b;
Craswell et al. 1995; Francis et al. 2005). If the divergence is
related to the incentive for owners to expropriate minority
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1) Pyramidal ownership structure is a chain of ownership relations, in which
usually controlling shareholder or his/her family members directly control a
firm, which in turn controls another firm and so forth. Via pyramidal
ownership, controlling shareholder can control a series of firms in the chain
of ownership structure with ownership less than 100%. The example of this
structure will be discussed later in this article. In Korea, according to the
Korea Fair Trade Committee (KFTC) regulations, affiliated companies in the
designated large business conglomerates are not allowed to have cross-
shareholdings with other affiliated companies in the same conglomerates.
But circular shareholding is not banned. KFTC have designated large
business conglomerates in terms of their asset size. Specific regulations are
imposed on each of the affiliated firms constituting the designated large
business conglomerates. 
shareholders, it is possible that the owner asks the auditor to
provide low quality audit service in order not to reveal true
financial status of the client firms to potential investors.2) We call
this view ‘low audit quality perspective.’
Using 436 firm-year observations collected over 2003-2005
period from Korean stock market and the divergence data
provided by Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC), we examine
above two predictions. The empirical results reveal that the audit
fee is negatively correlated with the divergence, supporting low
audit quality perspective. 
This paper could contribute to regulators, academics, as well
as practitioners and investors in various ways. First, according
to the findings in this study, regulators need to pay more
attention to the firm having greater divergence in order to
improve the transparency of the firms. Academics also need to
find way to improve the audit quality for that kind of firms. Both
accountants and investors also need to pay more attention when
they audit or consider investment in the firms with greater
divergence. The divergence could be proxy for the level of
expropriation by major shareholders against minority
shareholders.
This study is composed as follows. Section 2 discusses prior
literature and present research hypothesis. The Section 3
explains the sample, followed by empirical analyses in the
Section 4. The final section concludes the study.
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2) In contrast, if the owner needs to persuade potential investors to invest in his
firm, he has an incentive to signal the firm’s quality (Fan and Wong 2005).
The hiring of high-quality auditor is one of the example for the way to signal
the quality. However, Fan and Wong’s study using Korean data find
inconclusive result on this topic. In addition, because there exist auditor size
regulation in Korea for the listed firms (a client firm that its asset size is
greater than 2 trillion Korean Won must hire a large auditor) during the
sample period of Fan and Wong’s study (1994-1996), the analyses using
Korean auditor choice data are not that much meaningful. When we replicate
Fan and Wong’s study with our data, we also fail to find any significant
relationship between the level of ownership divergence and large auditor
choice.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
The Effect of Corporate Ownership Structure
Investors who have a large portion of ownership of a firm have
strong incentives to maximize the firm’s value and are able to
gain information and monitor managers as an agent who have
incentive not to act in the best interest of the principal-
shareholders, and so can help mitigate one of the agency
problems — those of conflicts of interest between outside
shareholders and hired professional managers (Jensen and
Mecling 1976). 
However, complicated structures of modern firms where a
controlling shareholder who possesses almost full control over
the firm and other minority shareholder stay outside of the firm
constitute another suitable but different context of studying the
agency theory, in which controlling shareholders have
opportunity to expropriate wealth from other outside minority
shareholders. Large investors may represent their own interests,
which need not coincide with the interests of other investors in
the firm, or with the interests of employees and managers
(Shleifer and Vishiny 1997).
When ownership is sufficiently concentrated such that an
owner gains dominant control of a firm, the controlling owner is
able to determine the profit distribution and use firms to
generate private benefits that are not shared by minority
shareholders and may sometimes deprive minority shareholders
of their rights to share profits. These agency conflicts can be
exacerbated as the controlling owner leverages control through
stock pyramids or cross-shareholdings while keeping his or her
ownership level low. This is called as ‘entrenchment effect of
ownership’ (Fan and Wong 2002). 
From the more actual standpoint of view that is used in the
KFTC’s definition of the divergence between voting rights and
cash flow rights of a controlling shareholder of a firm, the
mechanism of creating the disparity between ownership and
control is understood more easily. A controlling shareholder,
alone or with related parties, gains de facto control of the
company. In a typical Korean large conglomerate, there is a great
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deal of intra-group shareholdings among the affiliated firms. A
controlling shareholder or his/her family not merely directly
owns a fraction of equity but also indirectly has de facto control
from the portion of equity which is held by the related parties,
such as senior managers of the firm, affiliated non-profit
organization and other affiliated firms (Kim and Yi 2006).
However, the controlling shareholder does not have only an
incentive to expropriate other investors’ wealth, since the
controlling shareholder has his/her cash flow rights of the firm,
which means he/she loses some wealth too. The higher the cash
flow rights the largest shareholder has the higher is the cost
he/she bears if he or she were to expropriate, and therefore the
more aligned is his/her incentive with minority shareholders. In
this way, the incentive of the controlling shareholders to
expropriate outside investors is mitigated by their possible
pecuniary loss, which means the more ownership the controlling
owner has, the less he/she likely to expropriate.3) This is so-
called the incentive effect or alignment effect (Jensen and
Meckiling 1976; Fan and Wong 2002). However, when control
rights increase and become greater than cash flow rights or when
the controlling shareholder gain effective control via complicated
ownership structures such as pyramidal ownership and cross-
shareholding, the context in which the controlling shareholder
find him/herself changes, where the entrenchment effect
dominates the alignment effect.
In this kind of ownership structure, the corporate governance
of the firm can become deficient because of the ineffective
monitoring by the board. Controlling shareholder and often
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3) Fan and Wong (2002; 2005) offer a simple example to explain the case. When
considering buying 30% of Firm B, an entrepreneur has two options. The
entrepreneur can directly buying 30% of equity of Firm B, which constitutes
a typical horizontal corporate structure, or alternatively he/she can indirectly
invest in Firm B through Firm A, of which he/she owns 50%, which he/she
controls. Choosing the alternative way, the entrepreneur can purchase the
shares of the Firm B paying only half cost of direct investment, leaving the
saved purchasing cost to be borne by the outside shareholders. Given the
ownership illustrated above, it costs the entrepreneur only $15 for every
$100 expropriated from Company B and therefore 85$ of net benefit from
expropriation falls into the entrepreneur’s hands. Clearly, if stock pyramids
or cross-shareholdings were used to consolidate control, they would also
result in the divergence between ownership and control, which exacerbates
the entrenchment problem of controlling owners.
his/her family members usually hold powerful positions on both
the top management team and the board of directors. Controlling
shareholders are entrenched at the helm and have the power to
designate and monitor corporate managers. Thus, having
effective control of a corporation enables the controlling owner to
make important decisions, such as profit-sharing policy.
Although the minority shareholders are entitled to the cash flow
rights in the proportion to their share investments, they face the
uncertainty that the entrenched controlling owner may
opportunistically deprive them of their rights.4)
Hypothesis Development
When the controlling shareholder is entrenched by his/her
voting power and there is a large separation of the voting and
cash flow rights, the credibility of accounting is reduced (Fan
and Wong 2002; Francis et al. 2005; Kim and Yi 2005). Outside
investors pay less attention to the reported accounting numbers,
because they expect that the controlling owner produces and
reports accounting information out of private incentive rather
than as a true reflection of the firm’s economic status. In
addition, the firm’s reported earnings may not be trusted by the
outside investors since they perceive the possible manipulation
of earnings for outright expropriation by the controlling
shareholder. Furthermore, outside investors are aware of the
controlling owner’s incentive to avoid reporting information that
would invite scrutiny from outside shareholders. As a result, the
loss of credibility in reported earnings lowers the stock price
informativeness of the earnings (Fan and Wong 2002). Francis et
al. (2005) also document that earnings are less informative
relative to dividends in U.S. firms with dual-class5) stocks that
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4) Even this kind of agency problem, which arises between controlling
shareholders and minority shareholders, is not often illegal. Entrenched
controlling shareholder’s opportunistic behavior may be often conducted
within the legal constraints.
5) Dual-class stocks are a kind of multiple-classes stocks. When the firm has
issued two or more classes of stock with differential voting rights, the voting
structures constitute multiple-classes stocks. In a firm with a single class of
common stock, cash flow rights and voting rights are equal and a controlling
owner bears pro rata the shareholder wealth consequences of his/her
decision. In a dual class structure, one class of common stock typically has
more votes per share than the other, while both classes have equal or almost
separate voting rights from cash flow rights.
Expropriation, if detected, may induce close attention and
external intervention by minority shareholders, analysts, stock
exchanges, or regulators. Therefore the desire to keep away from
external monitoring, potential legal problems, and consequent
loss of reputation capital likely encourages insiders to veil their
private benefits and non-value-maximizing decisions by
managing reported accounting income, especially in the weak
legal environment (Haw et al. 2004; Leuz et al. 2003). Because
minority shareholders and other external stakeholders are not
likely to have the resources or access to relevant information
enough to observe insiders’ actions, they are, as a result, unable
to detect and straighten out insider’s earnings management. In
particular, by limiting outflow of information to the public, large
shareholder also allows political rent seekers to evade potential
competition and social sanctions, thus resulting in less
disclosure and low transparency in reported income (Fan and
Wong 2002).
These characteristics related to the ownership divergence could
be influence the level of audit fees. On the one hand, the
divergence could be positively associated with audit fees if we
accept the ‘audit risk perspective.’ The auditor is paid a fee to
attest to the assertions contained in the client’s financial
statements, and presumably the fee reflects the work the auditor
must perform to bear the audit risk (Choi et al. 2007a; Craswell
et al. 1995; Simmunic 1980). Seetharaman et al. (2002) find that
audit fees reflect risk differences across countries with different
level of legal liability regime. Higher legal regime motivates the
auditors to increase effort in defense against the increased
likelihood of future litigation (Simunic and Stein 1996) and/or
charge an insurance premium to cover possible future litigation
costs (Pratt and Stice 1994). In either case, audit fees should
increase if the divergence is related to the risk of audit. As
explained before, because the divergent firms have less
transparency and could distort financial reporting, the auditor
needs to bear more audit risk. Thus, audit fee could increase as
the divergence increases, consistent with the audit risk
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equal cash flow rights per share(Francis et al. 2005; Villalonga and Amit
2006).
perspective.
On the other hand, it is well known that audit quality is priced
in the audit market (Carcello et al. 2002; Choi et al. 2007b;
Craswell et al. 1995; Francis et al. 2005). Consistent with this
view, the extant audit pricing models, developed first by Simunic
(1980) and further extended by Choi et al. (2007a), predict that
audit fees, which are equal to audit costs at a competitive
equilibrium, are a function of (1) client characteristics such as
client size, client complexity, and client-specific risk and (2)
auditor characteristics such as audit firm size and industry
expertise at the national level. For example, there is ample
evidence that high-quality auditors enjoy audit fee premiums
(Simunic 1980). In addition, recent studies by Ferguson et al.
(2003) and Francis et al. (2005) document that auditors with
city-based industry leadership are able to charge higher audit
fees to their clients because city-specific industry expert auditors
can provide high-quality audit service. 
Thus, if the divergence is related to the incentive for owners to
expropriate minority shareholders, it is possible that the owner
asks the auditor to provide low quality audit service in order not
to reveal true financial status of the client firms to potential
investors, following ‘low audit quality perspective.’
In summary, because audit risk perspective and low audit
quality perspective provide different predictions with respect to
the association between audit fees and the divergence, we
provide the hypothesis in the null form as follows:
H: There is no association between audit fees and the
ownership divergence.
If we reject the null hypothesis as presented in the above
hypothesis H, the results would support either audit risk or low
audit quality perspective. If we fail to reject the null hypothesis,
it is possible that there exist no relationship at all among the
audit fee and the divergence or the audit risk perspective cancel
low audit quality perspective out.
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METHODOLOGY
Sample and Data
We estimate the association between audit fees and deviation
of control rights over cash flow rights using data from 436 audits
(firm-year observations) performed for the listed large
conglomerate- affiliated firms in Korea during 3 years from 2003
to 2005. KFTC compiles ownership and control rights data of
large conglomerate-affil iated companies, computes the
divergence between them and posts the data in its homepage.6)
KFTC datasets include the portion of shares held by a controlling
shareholder and by his/her related parties. Related parties
include relatives, senior managers of the firm, affiliated non-
profit organizations, and other affiliated firms. Only listed firms
are selected as sample firms since reliable financial data for
other key variables are not obtainable even though KFTC
datasets includes both of the listed and non-listed firms. For
audit fees and audit hours, we collected the data from the filings
posted in the DART system.7) For control variables other than
audit fees and audit hours, we obtained data from KIS-VALUEII
database. For a simple recognition of the status of control and
ownership structures of the sample, table 1 presents basic
statistics of the cash flow rights and the voting rights of the
controlling shareholders and the divergences between these two. 
Table 1 shows that, for the full sample, the average cash flow
right of a controlling shareholder and his/her family members is
13.19% which is 30.17% lower than 43.36% of voting right
he/she has. The divergence is substantial, ranging from 0 to 79.
79%. The standard deviation (SD) is also very large (20.58),
suggesting that there is substantial variability for the divergence.
In summary, this can be translated as a controlling shareholder
and his/her family member increase and gain de facto control via
the ownership of the related parties. This result is consistent
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6) www.ftc.go.kr.
7) DART (Data Analysis, Retrieval and Transfer System) is an electronic
disclosure system operated by FSS(Financial Supervisory Service of Korea)
that allows companies to submit disclosures online, where it becomes
immediately available to investors and other users.
with the finding by Claessens et al. (2000). 
Model
To test hypothesis H, we posit the following regression models:
FEE = a0 + a1 DVC + a2 SIZE + a3 BIG4 + a4 ROA + a5 LEV + a6
INVREC + a7 ISSUE + a8 YEAR2003 + a9 YEAR2004 + e
(1)
where, a0 to a9 are regressional parameters, e is a normally
distributed error term, and the other variables are defined as
follows.
FEE = natural log of audit fees in thousand Korean Won;
DVC = divergence, in percentage value, between cash flow
rights and voting rights of a controlling shareholder of a
firm;
SIZE = natural log of year-end market value of common equity
in thousand Korean won;
BIG4 = 1 if the auditor of the firm is one of international Big 4-
affiliated auditors and 0 otherwise;
ROA = return on assets of a firm;
LEV = long-term liabilities divided by total assets of a firm;
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Table 1. Basic Statistics of Ownership Structures (%)
N Mean Median SD Min. Max.
Cash flow right 436 13.190 4.015 17.179 0 75.040
Voting right 436 43.356 41.290 17.411 0.600 95.170
Divergence 436 30.165 30.945 20.580 0 79.790
Variable definition: Cash flow right = a sum of direct ownership
stakes(%) held by a controlling shareholder of a firm and his/her family
members’ ownership of the firm. Voting right = a sum of direct
ownership held by a controlling shareholder of a firm, ownership held by
family members and the ownership held by senior managers of the firm,
affiliated non-profit organization and affiliated firms. Divergence = a
difference between Cash flow right and Voting right, computed by
subtracting Cash flow right(%) from Voting right(%) of the controlling
shareholder of the firm. 
INVREC = sum of inventories and account receivables divided
by total assets of a firm;
ISSUE = 1 if a firm has issued long-term debts or equities
within three years and 0 otherwise;
YEAR2003 = 1 when a firm year is 2003 and 0 otherwise;
YEAR2004 = 1 when a firm year is 2004 and 0 otherwise.
Equation (1) use FEE as a dependent variable, which is a
natural logarithm of yearly audit fees paid by a client, as posted
in the DART system. Equation (1) includes a test variable, DVC
which is defined as the divergence between voting rights and
cash flow rights of a controlling shareholder of a firm. If the audit
risk perspective dominates, the coefficient on DVC (i.e., a1) is
expected to have a positive relation with FEE (i.e., a1 > 0). In
contrast, if low audit quality perspective dominates, the
coefficient on DVC (i.e., a1) is expected to have a negative relation
with FEE (i.e., a1 < 0). 
The control variables used in equation (1) are chosen based on
the prior studies of Simunic (1980) and Choi et al. (2007a). SIZE
represents firm size which is measured by the natural logarithm
of the market value of common stock. Generally, large firms have
greater assets to be audited by external auditors, incurring more
audit efforts and thus increasing audit fees (Simunic 1980). So,
SIZE is expected to be positively related to FEE (i.e., a2 > 0). BIG4
captures auditor’s size effect on audit fees. Big brand name
auditors are well documented to earn a fee premium over non-
Big audit firms (Craswell et al. 1995; Francis 1984). So BIG4 is
expected to have a positive relation to FEE. ROA and LEV is the
proxies for a client-specific audit risk to be borne by auditors.
ROA is introduced because more profitable companies are less
likely to end up in bankruptcy and so is expected to have a
negative association with FEE. LEV captures risk associated with
higher level of debt and thus is expected to have a positive
relation with FEE. To clear the possible effect of outliers, this
variable is first winsorized at the 10st and the 90th percentile
values. We also include the ratio of inventory and receivables out
of total assets (INVREC) as a proxy for audit complexity, which
increases audit fees. New debt or equity issuance dummy (ISSUE)
captures demands for quality audit since a firm is likely to have
an incentive to produce quality reporting so as to invite outside
94 Seoul Journal of Business
investors when the firm is in needs of new external financing.
Quality reporting requires quality audit, which increases audit
fees. ISSUE also measures litigation risks from bankruptcy,
which are likely to be greater for firms who have recently
financed external funds by issuing new equity or bonds in capital
markets. In either case, ISSUE is expected to have a positive
relation with audit fees. 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for all variables included
in the regression models. The mean of naturally logged audit fees
(FEE) is 11.74. Although it is not reported in the table 2, the
arithmetic mean of raw audit fees (not logged value) is 184.6
million Korean Won. Sample firms have, on average, 30.17% of
divergence (DVC) between cash flow rights and voting rights of
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Table 2. Summary Statistics of Regression Variables
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max.
FEE 11.744 11.608 0.834 9.546 14.731
DVC 30.165 30.945 20.580 0.000 79.790
SIZE 19.616 19.678 1.754 15.303 25.298
BIG4 0.876 1.000 0.329 0.000 1.000
ROA 5.327 5.245 7.487 -63.940 34.670
LEV 37.244 26.600 32.831 3.250 105.240
INVREC 0.210 0.192 0.128 0.000 0.713
ISSUE 0.486 0.000 0.500 0.000 1.00
Variable definition: FEE = a natural log of audit fees in thousand Korean
Won. DVC = divergence, in percentage value, between cash flow rights
and voting rights of a controlling shareholder. SIZE = a natural log of
year-end market value of common equity in thousand Korean won. BIG4
= 1 if the auditor of the firm is one of international Big 4(5, 6) affiliated
auditors and 0 otherwise. ROA = a return on assets of a firm. LEV =
long-term liabilities divided by total assets of a firm. INVREC = inventory
and an accounts receivable divided by total assets of a firm. ISSUE = 1 if
a firm has issued long-term debts or equities within three years and 0
otherwise. 
controlling shareholders. The mean of naturally logged market
value of common equity of firms (SIZE) is 19.62. If computed as
raw (not logged) market value, the mean of raw market value of
common equity of sample firms is 1.691 billion Korean Won.
Because the sample firms are the firms belong to business
conglomerates in Korea, they are on average very large firms. On
average, 87.6% of audits are conducted by one of the Big 4
auditors (BIG4). Sample firms have, on average, 5.33% of ROA
and 37.24% of leverage ratio (LEV). Account receivables and
inventories comprise, on average, 21% of total assets (INVREC).
On average, 49% of firms in the sample have issued long-term
debt or equities within three prior years (ISSUE).
Correlations
Table 3 reports the Pearson correlation coefficient for all
variables that are included in the equation (1) and respective p
values.8) As shown in the table 3, the divergence between voting
rights and cash flow rights of a controlling shareholder is
negatively correlated to audit fees. The correlation coefficient is 
-0.3334 between DVC and FEE and is significant at less than 1%
level. This result is apparently inconsistent with the audit risk
perspective but consistent with low audit quality perspective. 
In addition, the strong positive correlations between FEE and
SIZE and between FEE and BIG4 support the previous literature
that large firms and firms audited by Big 4 are likely to charge
higher fees. In addition, positive correlation between FEE and
LEVE support the prediction that risky firms pay higher audit
fees. However, the positive correlation between FEE and ROA
does not support the prediction. In addition, negative correlation
between FEE and INVREC also do not support the findings in
prior studies. This could be due to failure to control for other
correlated variables. Thus, we are going to perform multivariate
regression analyses later. There exists strong negative correlation
between DVC and SIZE too (-0.3154).
Among control variables, highest correlation exist between
SIZE and ROA (0.3570) and between SIZE and INVREC 
(-0.3099). However, given that none of the correlations among
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8) Because the results using Spearman correlation are qualitatively similar, we
do not report them separately for the simplicity purpose.
control variables are greater than 0.4, it is not likely the
correlations cause multicolineariy problem during the
multivariate regression analyses.
Regression Analyses
Next, we perform regression analyses with equation (1) to see if
the divergence influence audit fees even after controlling for
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Table 3. Pearson Correlations (p-values) for Variables











0.1022 -0.1015 0.3570 0.0813
ROA 1.0000
(0.0329) (0.0341) (<.0001) (0.0900)
0.3038 0.0589 0.1090 0.1064 -0.3044
LEV 1.0000
(<.0001) (0.2191) (0.0227) (0.0262) (<.0001)
-0.1914 0.1015 -0.3099 0.0518 -0.1029 -0.1710
INVREC 1.0000
(<.0001) (0.0340) (<.0001) (0.2804) (0.0316) (0.0003)
-0.0505 0.1793 -0.0496 -0.0800 -0.0627 -0.0332 0.1206
ISSUE 1.0000
(0.2921) (0.0002) (0.3008) (0.0952) (0.1906) (0.4882) (0.0117)
Variable definition: FEE = a natural log of audit fees in thousand Korean
Won. DVC = divergence, in percentage value, between cash flow rights and
voting rights of a controlling shareholder. SIZE = a natural log of year-end
market value of common equity in thousand Korean won. BIG4 = 1 if the
auditor of the firm is one of international Big 4(5,6) affiliated auditors and 0
otherwise. ROA = a return on assets of a firm. LEV = long-term liabilities
divided by total assets of a firm. INVREC = inventory and an accounts
receivable divided by total assets of a firm. ISSUE = 1 if a firm has issued
long-term debts or equities within three years and 0 otherwise.
other possibly correlated variables. The results are reported in
table 4.9) We repeat regressions twice — with and without DVC
variable. The column (1) of table 4 reports the results without
DVC and the column (2) reports those with DVC. 
First of all, the results shown in column (1) reveal that the
explanatory power of the model is very high (0.752) as reported
in the bottom row of the table, suggesting that the model
explains the substantial portion of audit fees. As also reported in
the table, all the control variables are significantly correlated
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9) For all the results reported in Table 4, we use White’s (1980) method to
correct for the heteroskedasticity. In addition, we check VIF scores to see if
the multicolinearity cause any problem but there were no VIF values greater
than 10.
Table 4. Result of Regression Analyses
Variables
Expected
(1) Reduced model (2) Full model
Sign Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value
DVC ? -0.0016 -3.53***
SIZE + 0.4154 30.27*** 0.3989 27.26***
BIG4 + 0.0987 3.95*** 0.1127 4.44***
ROA - -0.0088 -5.63*** -0.0089 -5.78***
LEV + 0.0007 4.89*** 0.0007 5.06***
INVREC + 0.2316 3.24*** 0.2144 2.95***
ISSUE + -0.0177 -1.04 -0.0049 -0.28
Constant ? 1.4113 12.23*** 1.5865 12.64***
Adj. R2 0.752 0.758
Variable definition: FEE = a natural log of audit fees in thousand Korean
Won. DVC = divergence, in percentage value, between cash flow rights
and voting rights of a controlling shareholder. SIZE = a natural log of
year-end market value of common equity in thousand Korean won. BIG4
= 1 if the auditor of the firm is one of international Big 4(5,6) affiliated
auditors and 0 otherwise. ROA = a return on assets of a firm. LEV =
long-term liabilities divided by total assets of a firm. INVREC = inventory
and an accounts receivable divided by total assets of a firm. ISSUE = 1 if
a firm has issued long-term debts or equities within three years and 0
otherwise. 
The model used in the regression: FEE = a0 + a1 DVC + a2 SIZE + a3
BIG4 + a4 ROA + a5 LEV + a6 INVREC + a7 ISSUE + a8 YEAR2003 + a9
YEAR2004 + e
***: significant at the 1% level.
with audit fees. In addition, the coefficients on the control
variables are all in the expected directions, except ISSUE
variable. For example, the coefficients on SIZE is 0.4154 which is
significant at the 1% level (t = 30.27).
The results using the full model of equation (1) are reported in
the column (2) of table 4. The coefficients on DVC is -0.0016
which is significant at the 1% level (t = -3.53), supporting the
prediction of low audit quality perspective. The explanatory
power slightly increases from 0.752 in column (1) to 0.758 in
column (2). In addition, there are no qualitative differences for
other control variables at all between column (1) and (2). These
results clearly suggest that the low audit quality effect dominates
the audit pricing mechanism with respect to the divergence. It
implies that the firms with greater divergence do not want high-
quality audit service, thus ask auditors to perform only low-
quality audit service and pay audit fees accordingly.
Controls for the Endogeneity
It may be possible that the documented results up to table 4
could be endogenuous firm characteristics that determines both
the corporate governance mechanism and audit fees. For
example, a small-sized client firm may have weak corporate
governance mechanism and also prefer low quality audit service.
In this case, not the corporate governance mechanism but also
the firm size is the main driver of the findings. To check this
possibility, we adopt 2-stage regression method by using the
following first stage probit regression model.
GOODCG = – 4.7179 + 0.2664 SIZE – 1.9208 ROA – 0.6178
ISSUE + 0.2176 LEV + e (2)
In equation (2), a0 to a4 are regressional parameters, e is a
normally distributed error term, and GOODCG is the measure of
good corporate governance. The variable has a value of 1 if the
DVC is below median value and 0 otherwise. Because there exist
no prior studies that examine the determinants of the ownership
divergence, we choose three determinants of GOODCG (ROA,
ISSUE, and LEV) through trial and errors. First, we select every
control employed in equation (1) and several other possible
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variables and run the probit regression. Among the control
variables employed, we left all the variables that have significant
coefficients and drop the insignificant variables. As a result, only
four variables are left finally.10) The explanatory power (pseudo
R2) of the model is 0.1128 which is not that high. This low
explanatory power suggests that there is no strong reason for a
company to have low or high ownership divergence.
After adding the inverse Mills ratio calculated using equation
(2) into equation (1), we re-perform all the logit analyses reported
in this study. However, the second stage regression results do
not change qualitatively at all. For example, if we perform the
same analyses as those reported in column (2) of table 4, the
coefficient on the DVC is -0.0041 which is significant at 1% level
(t = -2.80; p = 0.006). The coefficient on inverse Mills ratio is
1.1896 which is significant at 5% level (t = 2.37; p = 0.019). In
summary, these results suggest that endogeneity does not
influence our findings in this study.
CONCLUSION
Ownership and control structures of many public companies in
East Asia and Western Europe are well characterized by family-
control, close relation of managers with the controlling owners,
and the controlling owner’s voting rights exceeding cash flow
rights. This study examines the association between ownership
structure and audit fess. Especially, this study focuses on the
ownership structure measured by the divergence of control and
ownership. If an owner owns a company through the pyramidal
structure, it is possible that the voting rights of the owner are
greater than the cash flow rights of the same owner. The
difference could influence the firm’s audit-related policy and
auditor’s behavior. This study examines this issue.
On the one hand, the divergence could be positively associated
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10) Most of the dropped variables in this process do not have significant
difference between the two groups in the univariate tests. For example, LOSS
variable, which have a value of 1 if the firm report loss in current year and 0
otherwise, is not significant different between the two (t = -1.37) in the
univariate test and drop during the probit regression process because the
coefficient of the variable is not significant.
with audit fees. The auditor is paid a fee to attest to the
assertions contained in the client’s financial statements, and
presumably the fee reflects the work the auditor must perform to
bear the audit risk. Audit fees should increase if the divergence
is related to the risk of audit. On the other hand, it is well known
that audit quality is priced in the audit market. If the divergence
is related to the incentive for owners to expropriate minority
shareholders, it is possible that the owner asks the auditor to
provide low quality audit service in order not to reveal true
financial status of the client firms to potential investors.
Using 436 firm-year observations collected over 2003-2005
period from Korean stock market and the divergence data
provided by KFTC, we examine above two predictions. The
empirical results reveal that the audit fee is negatively correlated
with the divergence. This finding is somehow inconsistent with
the finding in Fan and Wong’s (2005) study with other countries’
data that have positive association between quality auditor
choice and the ownership divergence. The difference could be
due to different investor protection and legal system in different
countries. Because the level of investor protection is low in
Korea, it is possible that client firms in Korea do care less about
audit risk but care more about saving audit fee compared with
client firms in the strong investor protection and legal system.
Under the lack of legal risk, auditors also have less incentive to
provide high-quality audit service to avoid investor lawsuits.
The findings in this study are very important because it can
contribute to regulators, academics, as well as practitioners and
investors in various ways.
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